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DDI-492-70

16 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Intelligence Inputs for Gerard Smith's
NATO Briefing

1. As I indicated Friday, we have been asked on behalf of ACDA to authorize use of various intelligence figures in Ambassador Smith's Top Secret presentation on SALT matters to the North Atlantic Council this Wednesday. A large proportion, contained in a table comparing US and Soviet strategic forces levels projected for mid-1970, pose no release problem since they have already been passed to NATO in the US MC 161 submission. Moreover, Phil Farley has agreed to drop from the presentation, as unnecessary and potentially misleading, a proposed mid-1979 table which in effect would have matched the NIPP-70 projections for that year against a postulated US force not materially changed from what it is now. We were also concerned about the propriety of releasing the NIPP figures.

2. ACDA still wants to include two other intelligence items not previously released to NATO. In my judgement, however, the passages concerned are relevant to the discussion, are responsibly worded, and do not go beyond what has been more or less authoritatively leaked to the press. I therefore recommend CIA authorization for their inclusion. The passages in question are as follows:

- a. In concluding a discussion of Soviet coyness on the MIRV issue at Helsinki, the draft of Ambassador Smith's remarks contains the following paragraph on the status of the Soviet and US multiple warhead programs, drawing on the NIE 11-8-69 analysis for the Soviet part:

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"Their multiple warhead test program for the SS-9 is continuing. If a simple MRV system is the goal of this program, initial operational deployment could occur within the next few months. If the Soviets are working toward development of an independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) based on the system being tested, at least another year of flight testing would be required. Our Poseidon and Minuteman III development flight test programs are scheduled for completion by mid-summer of this year. We have not reached a decision on our approach to the MIRV issue and are still examining the relevant factors involved."

- b. In concluding his remarks, Ambassador Smith is meant to express the desire to respond briefly to some questions raised January 28 about the strategic balance, "and in particular concerning the rate of SS-9 deployment." The proposed SS-9 paragraph, quoted below, would appear quite acceptable if the bracketed material is deleted. (There has been no evidence of new starts since early November and the intervening sentences depend on the references to recent activity.) The rounded numbers are reasonably close to the ones we carry without being overly precise: our 1 January figures were 198 operational and 77 more known to be under construction.

"Soviet starts on SS-9 missile sites have continued at approximately the same pace over the past several years /with no sign of slackening since the start of SALT/. They have about 200 SS-9 currently operational


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with about 80-100 more under construction. /It is in the nature of such construction that several silos are started at one time. To see a trend, one must project over a period of time. There have been a number of recent SS-9 starts.7 If the Soviet buildup continues, we will, of course, have to take compensating steps involving our own force build up as we have with Safeguard defense of Minuteman. We naturally hope that a SALT agreement will make it possible to avoid the necessity of such steps."



Executive Officer
Strategic Research

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Approved For Release 2005/12/24 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000100020012-9

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